The Bangladesh–India river water-sharing dispute represents one of the most enduring and complex transboundary water conflicts in South Asia. Despite shared geography, historical cooperation, and multiple diplomatic engagements, the two countries continue to face unresolved tensions over the distribution and management of their 54 common rivers. This commentary examines the structural, political, legal, and environmental dimensions of the dispute, with particular attention to the growing urgency created by the approaching expiration of the Ganges Water Treaty in 2026 and the continuing deadlock over the Teesta River agreement.
At the core of the issue lies the asymmetry of river dependency and control. Bangladesh, as a lower riparian country, receives more than 90% of its freshwater from transboundary rivers originating outside its borders. These rivers, particularly the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna systems, are vital for agriculture, irrigation, inland navigation, fisheries, and ecological stability. India, as the upper riparian state in many of these rivers, exercises significant infrastructural control through barrages and diversion projects such as Farakka and Teesta. These interventions, while justified domestically for irrigation, hydropower, and port maintenance, have substantial downstream consequences, particularly in Bangladesh’s dry season water availability.
A critical turning point in the contemporary debate is the Ganges Water Treaty of 1996, which was initially seen as a landmark in bilateral cooperation. However, its effectiveness has been contested over time, with concerns raised regarding reduced dry-season flows and perceived deviations from equitable distribution. The situation becomes even more significant as the treaty approaches its expiration in December 2026. This impending deadline introduces a new layer of uncertainty, as Bangladesh faces the risk of further water insecurity if a renewed or revised agreement is not reached. Given the country’s dependence on consistent river flow for its agricultural calendar and ecological systems, the potential lapse of this treaty could have far-reaching social and economic implications.
The Ganges issue also serves as a gateway to understanding the broader failure of comprehensive river governance between the two countries. Despite the existence of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, institutional coordination has remained limited, and no basin-wide agreement has been achieved for the remaining shared rivers. This institutional gap becomes especially visible when contrasted with the unresolved Teesta River dispute, which remains one of the most politically sensitive water-sharing issues in the region.
The Teesta River dispute highlights the internal complexity of Indian federal politics in transboundary water governance. Although negotiations between Bangladesh and the central government of India have progressed at various stages, the agreement has repeatedly stalled due to objections from the state of West Bengal. The river is critical for irrigation in North Bengal, and political leadership in the state has expressed concerns that water-sharing arrangements could negatively affect local agricultural needs. As a result, even when diplomatic consensus exists at the national level, subnational political resistance has prevented the formalization of a binding treaty.
From Bangladesh’s perspective, the Teesta is equally vital. During the dry season, river flow decreases drastically, leaving Bangladesh with insufficient water for agriculture in northern regions. The resulting scarcity has led to increased groundwater dependency, soil degradation, and declining agricultural productivity. These conditions reinforce Bangladesh’s demand for a fair and guaranteed share of Teesta waters, often estimated at around 50% during critical months. The gap between Bangladesh’s expectations and India’s internal constraints reflects the broader structural imbalance in transboundary water negotiations.
This dispute is not only political but also deeply rooted in competing interpretations of international water law. Principles such as equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and prior notification of planned measures are central to global water governance frameworks, including the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and the 1966 Helsinki Rules. While these principles provide a legal foundation for cooperation, their implementation remains largely dependent on political will. In practice, the absence of binding enforcement mechanisms often reduces them to normative guidelines rather than operational rules.
The broader theoretical explanation of the dispute can be understood through both realist and liberal perspectives. From a realist standpoint, the asymmetry of power between India and Bangladesh creates structural inequality in bargaining capacity. India’s upstream position and regional dominance allow it greater control over shared water resources, while Bangladesh remains dependent and therefore more vulnerable. Conversely, liberal theory emphasizes the importance of institutions, cooperation, and legal frameworks in mitigating conflict. Mechanisms such as joint river commissions, regional dialogue, and international arbitration provide pathways for peaceful resolution, though their effectiveness depends on sustained political commitment.
Comparative international experiences offer useful insights into potential solutions. The Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan demonstrates that even deeply hostile neighbors can achieve long-term water-sharing stability through externally mediated agreements. Similarly, the Nile Basin Initiative illustrates how multilateral cooperation and shared institutional frameworks can facilitate dialogue among multiple riparian states. These examples suggest that structured cooperation, backed by international facilitation, can reduce tensions and promote sustainable water governance.
In the South Asian context, regional cooperation through organizations such as SAARC remains underdeveloped but potentially significant. A basin-wide framework involving Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and China could help address shared challenges such as climate change, glacial melt, and seasonal variability. However, political mistrust and institutional weakness continue to limit the effectiveness of such regional platforms.
Ultimately, the future of Bangladesh–India river water sharing depends on a combination of bilateral diplomacy, legal adherence, and institutional innovation. The approaching expiration of the Ganges Water Treaty and the unresolved Teesta agreement represent not only separate disputes but interconnected symptoms of a broader governance deficit. Without a shift toward more transparent data sharing, joint river management, and enforceable agreements, these tensions are likely to persist.
A sustainable resolution requires recognizing that river systems are not divisible national assets but shared ecological entities. Ensuring equitable distribution, preventing environmental degradation, and building trust between riparian states are essential for long-term stability. As climate change intensifies water stress across the region, the urgency of cooperative action becomes even more critical. The Bangladesh–India river water dispute, therefore, is not only a bilateral issue but also a test case for the future of transboundary water governance in South Asia.
Shanto Kairy
Research and Policy Analyst
Editors Associate
Council for Policy Review