Core Strategy: A Layered Peaceful Settlement Model
The most viable resolution framework is a three-layer approach combining bilateral negotiation, international water law, and legal arbitration as a backstop. This is not theoretical; it reflects how Bangladesh has already successfully resolved disputes with India and Myanmar in other domains.
Bangladesh’s historical record shows a consistent pattern:
- Territorial disputes → bilateral negotiation (Land Boundary Agreement, 2015)(Gupta, 2016)
- River disputes → bilateral negotiation (Ganges Treaty, 1996; Feni MoU, 2019)(Rahman, 2002; The Daily Star, 2019)
- Maritime disputes → international adjudication (ITLOS 2012; PCA 2014)(Gupta, 2016)
This establishes a clear policy direction: river disputes should be resolved first through negotiation, but supported by enforceable legal and institutional mechanisms.
Primary Solution: Strengthened Bilateral Negotiation Framework
a. Using Successful Precedents as Operational Models
The 2015 implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement demonstrates that even highly complex disputes involving sovereignty, enclaves, and political resistance can be resolved through sustained diplomatic engagement. The agreement succeeded because both states accepted that prolonged conflict was costlier than compromise (Gupta, 2016).
Similarly, the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty created a structured allocation system for dry-season flow, proving that river disputes can be institutionalized through negotiated formulas rather than unilateral control (Rahman, 2002).
The 2019 Feni River agreement further strengthens this model by showing that even small-scale water-sharing arrangements can be successfully concluded when both sides adopt a functional, need-based approach rather than a zero-sum political stance (The Daily Star, 2019).
Policy implication:
The Teesta and future Ganges negotiations should follow a formula-based, data-driven allocation model supported by joint monitoring rather than politically negotiated discretionary sharing (Rahman, 2002).
Legal Solution: Application of International Water Law
The dispute must be governed by established principles of international water law.
a. Helsinki Rules (1966)
These establish equitable and reasonable utilization, meaning water allocation must consider (International Law Association, 1966):
- population dependence: how many people rely on the river for survival, farming, and drinking water
-economic and agricultural need: importance of the river for irrigation, fisheries, and livelihoods
-hydrological contribution: how much water each country contributes to the river system
-environmental sustainability: impact on ecosystems, salinity, and biodiversity (e.g., Sundarbans)
b. UN Watercourses Convention (1997)
Key binding principles include (United Nations, 1997):
Article 5–6: equitable and reasonable utilization : This means both countries must share water fairly based on actual needs, not political power or geographical advantage.
Article 7: obligation not to cause significant harm : A country cannot use or divert river water in a way that seriously damages the other country (for example, reducing downstream flow causing agriculture loss or salinity intrusion).
Articles 11–19: prior notification, consultation, and environmental assessment : If one country plans a dam, barrage, or diversion, it must first inform the other country, discuss impacts, and study environmental consequences before construction.
Article 33: peaceful dispute settlement : If disagreements happen, both countries must try negotiation, mediation, or international legal settlement instead of conflict.
These principles directly apply to Bangladesh’s concerns over reduced dry-season flow in rivers like the Teesta and Ganges, where downstream ecological and agricultural harm has been widely documented (Adel, 2008).
Policy implication: Future treaties must not only mention these principles but must include:
- clear water-sharing formulas
- enforceable monitoring systems
- penalty or correction mechanisms if rules are violated
Otherwise, agreements remain political promises without enforcement.
Institutional Solution: Joint Rivers Commission (JRC)
The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission should be transformed from a discussion-based body into a working technical institution.
It should include:
real-time river flow data sharing: both countries continuously share updated water flow measurements so decisions are based on facts, not estimates. joint hydrological modeling: both sides use shared scientific models to predict river flow, droughts, and seasonal changes.
climate impact forecasting: predicting how climate change affects rainfall, glacier melt, and river volume.
environmental flow enforcement thresholds: setting a minimum water level that must always remain in the river to protect ecosystems and downstream users.
This institutional strengthening is essential because weak implementation has historically limited the effectiveness of the 1996 Ganges Treaty. Yet, the Joint River Commission for Ganges River was instrumental to settle the Ganges River water crisis and signed the treaty (Rahman, 2002).
Role of International Organizations
International organizations can support the peaceful settlement of the Bangladesh–India river water dispute through mediation, technical expertise, financing, and institutional monitoring. The role of the World Bank in facilitating the Indus Waters Treaty demonstrates how neutral third-party institutions can sustain long-term water cooperation even between rival states (Salman & Uprety, 2002; World Bank, 2018). Similarly, the Mekong River Commission and the Nile Basin Initiative show how joint technical institutions, data sharing, and basin-wide cooperation can reduce tensions over shared rivers (UNEP, 2012; Waterbury, 2002).
Organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations could help Bangladesh and India improve hydrological monitoring, climate adaptation, and river governance through neutral technical and financial support. These mechanisms could strengthen the Joint Rivers Commission and promote a more cooperative and rules-based framework for transboundary water management.
Legal Backstop: International Arbitration and Judicial Settlement
Bangladesh has already proven that it can successfully use international legal mechanisms when bilateral negotiations reach limits.
a. ITLOS Maritime Case (2012)
The tribunal gave Bangladesh a binding decision on maritime boundaries.
Meaning: international courts can fairly decide disputes even when countries disagree.
b. PCA Arbitration with India (2014)
Bangladesh and India settled maritime boundaries through arbitration.
Meaning: neutral legal institutions can resolve disputes without conflict.
Policy implication:
If river negotiations fail, Bangladesh can approach:
- International Court of Justice (ICJ)
- International arbitration bodies
But this should only be used when diplomacy does not work, because legal cases take time and depend on consent.
Key Operational Solution: Replicating Feni River-Type Agreements
The Feni River agreement (2019) provides the most practical short-term model for reducing tension in larger disputes (The Daily Star, 2019).
Its success comes from:
limited withdrawal quotas: only a small, clearly defined amount of water is shared (only 1.82 cusec)
mutual benefit framing: both sides gain something (e.g., drinking water supply for India, the small border town Sabroom)
preservation of downstream flow: Bangladesh still receives enough water for agriculture and environment (only 2-3% water during the dry season) (The Daily Star, 2019)
low political sensitivity: the issue was small enough not to trigger major political conflict
Policy application:
Instead of negotiating entire rivers at once:
- break rivers into smaller manageable sections
- start with basic needs like drinking water and irrigation
- slowly expand into full river basin agreements
This reduces political tension and makes agreement easier.
Regional Cooperation Layer
Although SAARC remains institutionally weak, regional water cooperation remains essential because rivers like the Brahmaputra and Ganges are part of a larger transboundary system involving China, Nepal, Bhutan, and India.
Regional cooperation should focus on:
flood management: joint early warning systems for floods
drought mitigation: shared planning for dry-season shortages
climate adaptation: preparing for glacier melt and changing rainfall
basin-wide data coordination: all countries share river data in one system
This aligns with global river basin models such as the Nile Basin Initiative and Mekong cooperation frameworks.
Final Policy Conclusion
The Bangladesh–India river water dispute is solvable because previous disputes were already solved peacefully:
Land disputes: negotiation
River treaties: partial agreements
Maritime disputes: international law decisions
So the correct strategy is:
Negotiation first → International water law framework → Arbitration as backup → Regional cooperation for long-term stability
Shanto Kairy
Research and Policy Analyst
Editors Associate
Council for Policy Review
Reference
- Adel, M. M. (2008). Transboundary river water sharing issues.
- Gupta, S. (2016). India and Bangladesh: The Land Boundary Agreement.
- Rahman, M. (2002). The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty analysis.
- The Daily Star. (2019, November 4). Feni River water sharing agreement. https://www.thedailystar.net/politics/sheikh-hasina-narendra-modi-talks-begin-in-new-delhi-prioritises-bangladesh-india-relation-1809646
- International Law Association. (1966). Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.
- Salman, M. A., & Uprety, K. (2002). Conflict and cooperation on South Asia’s international rivers: A legal perspective. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15130
- United Nations. (1997). Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
- UNEP. (2012). Nile Basin: Water resources management and development. https://www.unep.org/resources/report/nile-basin-water-resources-management-and-development
- UN Watercourses Convention. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf
- Waterbury, J. (2002). The Nile: National determinants of collective action. Yale University Press.
- World Bank. (2018, June 11). Fact sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the role of the World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank
- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). (2012). Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Case No. 16.
- Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). (2014). Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India.
- PCA Bangladesh v. India Maritime Award https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/bay-of-bengal-maritime-boundary-arbitration-between-bangladesh-and-india-bangladesh-v-india