Introduction
The transboundary river water-sharing relationship between Bangladesh and India is one of the most persistent water governance challenges in South Asia. The two countries share major river systems including the Ganges, Teesta, Brahmaputra, and Meghna, which are essential for agriculture, ecosystems, drinking water, and livelihoods.
Despite cooperation in other areas such as the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement (Gupta, 2016), water-sharing remains unresolved. The absence of a basin-wide governance framework and growing upstream–downstream asymmetry continue to intensify tensions (Adel, 2008). A major concern is the expiry of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty in December 2026.
Water Sources of Bangladesh and India
The dispute is deeply rooted in the unequal hydrological structure of both countries.
Bangladesh water sources:
Bangladesh is highly dependent on external river inflows. More than 90% of its freshwater comes from transboundary rivers originating outside its territory (Worldometer, 2017). Major sources include:
- Ganges–Padma system
- Brahmaputra–Jamuna system
- Meghna system
- Smaller transboundary rivers from India (Teesta, Feni, Dharla, etc.)
Due to reduced surface water availability, Bangladesh increasingly depends on groundwater extraction, especially for irrigation and drinking water. This has led to falling water tables, with some regions experiencing a decline of 1–3 meters annually (Shariful, 2010). Overuse of tube wells has also increased risks of arsenic contamination in rural areas.
India water sources:
India has a more diversified water structure, including:
- Large river systems (Ganges, Brahmaputra, Godavari, Krishna, etc.)
- Extensive groundwater reserves
- Monsoon rainfall-dependent surface water systems
- Reservoirs and irrigation canals
However, India relies heavily on groundwater for agriculture. In many regions, over 80% of irrigation depends on groundwater extraction (Zumbish, 2023). This reflects increasing stress on aquifers due to intensive agricultural production and irregular monsoon patterns.
Thus, both countries face groundwater dependence, but Bangladesh is more dependent on external river inflow, while India relies more on internal groundwater extraction and surface storage systems.
Dry-Season Water Scarcity
Dry-season scarcity is the most visible dimension of the dispute. In rivers like the Teesta, flow can fall to 200–500 cusecs during peak dry months (Basu, 2019), severely affecting irrigation and drinking water supply in northern Bangladesh.
India also faces seasonal shortages in states like West Bengal and Bihar, where agricultural demand is high and groundwater use is rising. Upstream regulation through barrages such as Farakka and Teesta is justified for irrigation, hydropower, and navigation, but it reduces downstream availability (Sharma, 2002).
Environmental and Economic Impacts
Environmental impacts are significant and unevenly distributed. In Bangladesh:
- Salinity intrusion in coastal areas (Chauhan, 2013)
- Degradation of river ecosystems and biodiversity loss
- Shrinking rivers and reduced navigability
- Increased groundwater extraction (Shariful, 2010)
The Sundarbans ecosystem is particularly vulnerable due to reduced freshwater inflow from the Ganges system.
Economically, both countries are affected:
Bangladesh faces reduced agricultural productivity, fisheries decline, and higher transport costs
India faces groundwater depletion, irrigation cost increases, and inter-state water competition (World Bank, 2012)
Agriculture remains central to both economies, making water allocation a high-stakes development issue.
Governance as a Central Challenge
Governance failure is the core structural issue underlying the dispute. As highlighted by UN analysis, water crises are often crises of governance rather than physical scarcity alone (United Nations, 2011).
Key governance challenges include:
1. Weak institutional coordination
The Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) lacks binding authority, enforcement power, and integrated basin management capacity (Adel, 2008).
2. Fragmented decision-making systems
Water governance is split across multiple agencies and political levels in both countries, reducing policy coherence.
3. Limited data sharing and transparency
Hydrological data exchange remains inconsistent, weakening trust and scientific allocation of water resources.
4. Federal complexity in India
States such as West Bengal play a decisive role in river-sharing decisions. This creates delays and political constraints in agreements like the Teesta deal (Tewari, 2017).
5. Weak regional governance architecture
South Asia lacks a strong basin-wide institution for collective water management, resulting in fragmented bilateral agreements (World Bank, 1998).
Governance weaknesses amplify hydrological stress and make technical solutions difficult to implement effectively.
Structural Drivers of the Dispute
The dispute is driven by interconnected structural factors that reinforce each other:
1. Hydrological variability and scarcity
Seasonal monsoon dependence creates extreme fluctuations between flood and dry periods, increasing pressure on shared rivers.
2. Power asymmetry
India’s larger economic and geopolitical capacity gives it greater bargaining power in negotiations, influencing outcomes and delay patterns (Mearsheimer, 1994).
3. Competing developmental needs
Both countries depend heavily on agriculture and irrigation, creating competing demands for the same water resources.
4. Weak institutional integration
Absence of basin-level planning prevents coordinated water distribution and long-term management strategies.
5. Climate variability
Changing rainfall patterns and increasing unpredictability of monsoon cycles further intensify uncertainty in water availability.
6. Groundwater pressure feedback loop
Declining surface water increases groundwater extraction, which in turn reduces long-term water security and increases dependency cycles in both countries.
These structural factors interact to produce a persistent cycle of scarcity, political tension, and weak institutional response.
Groundwater Dependence and Sustainability Risk
Groundwater has become a critical fallback resource in both countries.
In India, intensive agriculture and irrigation demand have led to widespread extraction, with groundwater supplying more than 80% of irrigation in several regions (Zumbish, 2023).
In Bangladesh, declining river flows have forced increased reliance on tube wells for irrigation and drinking water. This has resulted in falling groundwater tables and long-term sustainability concerns, including arsenic contamination and energy-intensive pumping systems (Shariful, 2010).
This shared dependence on groundwater indicates that surface water disputes are already shifting toward broader basin-wide water insecurity.
Conclusion
The Bangladesh–India river water-sharing dispute is a long-term structural challenge shaped by hydrological dependence, governance fragmentation, economic reliance on agriculture, and increasing groundwater stress.
While dry-season scarcity is the most visible issue, the deeper problem lies in governance failure and institutional fragmentation. Weak coordination mechanisms, limited transparency, and fragmented decision-making continue to prevent sustainable solutions.
As climate variability increases and demand grows, both surface water and groundwater systems are under rising pressure. Without stronger governance frameworks and coordinated basin-level management, the dispute is likely to remain a persistent regional challenge in South Asia.
Shanto Kairy
Research and Policy Analyst
Editors Associate
Council for Policy Review
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